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Introduction
The political science subfield of the study of interest 
groups is split between macro- and micro-level studies. 
On one hand, the most prominent of the macro-level theo-
ries is the population ecology theory, initiated by Gray and 
Lowery (1996), which is currently applied broadly in the 
discipline of political science. Studies in this field explain 
the shape of interest group populations in terms of their 
density and diversity. These aggregate numbers have 
macro-level implications related to representation (e.g., 
related to representational biases), policy making (e.g., as 
cause of policy deadlock), or social stability (e.g., as a 
source of social cohesion). Micro-level studies, on the 
other hand, aim to explain variations in the strategies and 
influence of individual interest groups. Such behaviors 
and outcomes are predominantly explained on the basis of 
indicators such as resources spent on lobbying, the types 
of interests represented, and issue and venue characteris-
tics (e.g., Bouwen 2004). Both theoretical foci have added 
much to the discipline and jointly form a relevant research 
community, but unfortunately hardly maintain effective 
conceptual linkages to each other (Halpin and Jordan 
2012; Holyoke 2017; Lowery 2015).
This overall lack of linkages between the two types of 
studies is problematic for at least two reasons. First, to 
validate the importance of their work, scholars in the pop-
ulation ecology field routinely assume that the structure 
of interest group communities substantially affects “the 
use of influence tools” by interest groups (Lowery and 
Gray 2004, 167) and “access to the policymaking pro-
cess” (Lowery and Gray 2015, 6). Yet, there are hardly 
any empirical examinations of these assumptions. This 
means that it remains unclear what the actual added value 
of the population ecology theory is for the broader politi-
cal science literature. Second, the absence of a link 
between macro- and micro-level studies is a problem for 
the latter type of studies as well, as they potentially suffer 
from omitted variable bias or have external validity prob-
lems. That is, particular micro-level lobby behaviors are 
likely to be better explained when accounting for particu-
lar macro-level contextual factors such as the number of 
similar groups in a particular policy domain or system. 
Population-related factors also affect the external validity 
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of single-domain or single-system research designs. We 
therefore concur with Holyoke (2017, also see Holyoke 
2015) when he notes that “the bifurcation of today’s inter-
est group literature between these two levels of analysis is 
a serious concern for theory development, research 
design, statistical modeling, and general progress in the 
subfield” (see also Baumgartner and Shoub 2015, 221; 
Leech 2015, 197; Lowery, Halpin, and Gray 2015, 267).
In this paper, we therefore aim to make a start in 
addressing this concern by innovatively analyzing 
whether the density of interest group systems affects the 
access groups have to political actors. In addition, we 
analyze whether population ecology theory provides us 
the necessary tools to explain which types of organiza-
tions persevere in dense communities (e.g., more special-
ized groups) and which are more likely to be excluded 
from the political process (e.g., encompassing groups). 
Empirically, we rely on a novel data set of more than 
three thousand organizations to test our assertions. This 
data set consists of various similar survey projects across 
different countries (namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Lithuania). In each of these countries, we 
have data on the structure of the interest group systems 
per policy domain and the access individual interest 
groups have to the policy process. Combined, this allows 
us to test whether macro-level population characteristics 
affect individual political outcomes, and whether these 
mechanisms follow the logic of population ecology 
theory.
In what follows, we first describe how macro-level 
studies of interest group communities are linked to stud-
ies of individual interest group behavior. Second, we pro-
vide hypotheses related to density and access gained, all 
derived from the organizational ecology literature. We 
then describe our data collection strategy and test our 
hypotheses. We end with a reflection on the findings and 
provide suggestions for additional research.
The Link between Macro- and Micro-
level Studies of Interest Groups
For over a century, social and political scientists have 
theorized about the size of interest group populations and 
its consequences for political stability, economic welfare, 
and “unbiased” political decision making. Truman (1951) 
already noted over sixty years ago that the number of 
interest groups has a direct effect on the stability of politi-
cal systems, as they provide the necessary checks and 
balances to political authorities. Truman was not alone in 
linking interest group density to political stability and 
moderation. We read similar arguments by Baumgartner 
and Leech (1998, 48): “in the immediate postwar years, 
one of the explanations of America’s success in maintain-
ing democracy while other countries fell to fascism was 
the vibrant group system based on competition and inde-
pendence from the state.” Schattschneider (1960) and 
Olson (1982), by contrast, worried about the unintended 
effects of the indeterminate growth of interest group 
activity. They warned that control over public policy by 
narrow-interest, self-serving groups, increases with the 
number of groups present, and, according to Olson, such 
control will limit economic growth and ultimately lead to 
a decline of social and economic welfare.
Despite widespread attention, however, it was not 
until the late 1980s that researchers started to systemati-
cally analyze interest group systems as organizational 
populations. Gray and Lowery’s work stands out in this 
regard. Their study on the populations of interest groups 
in the states of the United States has become a distinct 
subfield within the interest group literature. Especially 
innovative was the application of theories derived from 
biology, most prominently population ecology theory, to 
explain how interest group systems evolve over time and 
to explain their density and diversity at particular 
moments in time. Their work has been highly influential 
to many scholars studying interest group populations in 
the decades following their 1996 book (for overviews, 
see Hojnacki et al. 2012; Lowery and Gray 2015).
While its impact on the literature on interest group 
populations can hardly be overstated, the research did not 
fully live up to its initial promise. In Gray and Lowery’s 
early work, they identified great potential for the popula-
tion ecology theory to “provide us new opportunities to 
theoretically link micro- and institutional-level analyses 
of interest groups” (Lowery and Gray 1995, 25). More 
specifically, they stated, “the most important opportuni-
ties for future research may entail examining . . . implica-
tions of our population level findings for the survival, 
influence strategies, and life histories of individual orga-
nizations” (Gray and Lowery 1996, 249–50). Yet, in 
recent work, Lowery and Gray (2015, 7) themselves have 
admitted that the latter objectives have not really been 
achieved and are still “an area of organizational ecology 
we have only begun to explore.” Holyoke (2015) regards 
this lack of integration as a serious concern for theory 
development, research design, statistical modeling, and 
general progress in the subfield. Loomis (2015) has been 
even more outspoken and has questioned whether the 
links between this macro-level work and micro-level 
research are currently so fuzzy that the former might not 
contribute much to the interest group literature at all.
We are not as skeptical as Holyoke, and especially 
Loomis, as there certainly have been some (successful) 
attempts to link macro- and micro-level analysis. Yet, 
most were on linking population dynamics to mobiliza-
tion patterns and organizational maintenance prospects 
(see, for instance, Gray and Lowery 1997a; Halpin and 
Jordan 2009). In addition, some studies have focused on 
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the link between system density and the strategic choices 
groups make. For instance, Lowery et al. (2012) have 
found that in dense business interest communities, 
encompassing business groups are competitively 
excluded from the policy process by more specialized 
groups. Furthermore, the density of state interest group 
systems seems to affect the sponsoring of political action 
committees (PACs) in the United States (Gray and 
Lowery 1997b). More recently, Holyoke (2017) has 
found that merely taking into account the natural group-
ing of data by higher levels in the analysis, whether by 
interest niches, states, or levels of governance in the fed-
eral system, changed results significantly. The findings of 
Holyoke’s study stress the importance of exploring which 
relevant relationships exist between population and inter-
est group–level characteristics.
However, while studies on the link between interest 
group density and mobilization/strategic choices are 
already scarce, they are entirely absent when it comes to 
the link between population-level characteristics and 
political outcomes. For political outcomes, we have the 
blunt and commonly implicit assumption that larger 
numbers of groups almost inevitably lead to individual 
interest representatives having less access to the policy 
process, but to a higher aggregate potential influence by 
groups (e.g., Olson 1982; see discussion in Lowery 
2015, 215; Schattschneider 1960). However, none of the 
studies in this tradition analyzes whether the density of 
interest group communities actually affects the access 
individual groups gain to policymakers, let alone whether 
this pattern follows the premises of population ecology 
theory. As a result, the contribution of population-eco-
logical studies to the broader political science discipline, 
and the interest group literature more specifically, cannot 
be specified sufficiently.
How Does Interest Community 
Density Affect Interest Group 
Access?
To begin filling our knowledge gap on the drivers of pol-
icy access, we formulate a number of expectations 
derived from population ecology on how interest com-
munity density and policy access are related to each other. 
We focus, first, on the relation between the aggregate 
density in interest group communities and the access 
interest groups gain to policymakers. Second, we provide 
hypotheses about which types of organizations are more 
likely to gain access in a dense environment.
Our first aim is to explore the link between the den-
sity of interest group communities and the access oppor-
tunities interest groups have to policymakers. The 
relationship between crowdedness (density) of particu-
lar domains and access can best be understood by 
combining exchange theory and population ecology. 
Exchange-theoretical perspectives identify the demands 
or needs on the part of policymakers for information and 
political support as triggers for their supply by interest 
groups (e.g., Berkhout 2013). Interest groups selectively 
receive access to the policy process in exchange for 
these goods. We identify an European, executive-ori-
ented tradition and an American, legislative-oriented 
tradition of exchange-theoretical studies.
First, bureaucratic or executive policymakers face 
instrumental incentives to realize particular policy out-
comes. That is, interest representation is then viewed as 
an administrative instrument for the efficient execution of 
electorally mandated policy goals and access is appropri-
ately provided to “interests . . . that are essential to the 
achievement of a public purpose or those who overt con-
flict would be socially destructive” (Anderson 1977, 
144). Some exchange-theoretical studies, especially those 
in Europe, note that administrative incentives are likely to 
lead to a prioritization of “encompassing” interest repre-
sentation over narrow forms of representation (e.g., 
Braun 2012; Streeck and Kenworthy 2005) or note intra-
institutional variation in this regard (e.g., Bouwen 2004). 
As part of neo-corporatist practices, policymakers may 
offer “representational monopolies” to associations, for 
instance, by “talking only to organizations that exceed a 
certain size or qualify as majority representative of their 
constituency” and may further help privileged associa-
tions to eliminate competitors by “tacit or open assistance 
in recruiting or retaining members, which can take a vari-
ety of forms, from moral suasion to compulsory member-
ship” (Streeck and Kenworthy 2005, 450–51). These 
executive or administrative institutional practices lead to 
a privileged provision of access, especially in domains 
with low density.
Second, exchange-theoretical views focusing on U.S. 
legislative lobbying attend more explicitly to the elec-
toral motivations of politicians. “Informants win access 
because their offerings . . . suit lawmakers’ electoral 
needs better than those offered by their rivals” (Hansen 
1991, 3, 13–14). Some of these information models stay 
relatively close to the “supermarket” metaphor of eco-
nomic exchange, where campaign contributions are 
exchanged for legislative favors (e.g., Austen-Smith 
1995; Denzau and Munger 1986). In their less 
“economic”-inspired contribution model, Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) note that lobbyists will be selective in 
their targeting of particular legislators and their choice of 
intelligence provided. More to the point, lobbyists pro-
vide “matching grants,” consisting of strategically pro-
duced “political intelligence,” to support ongoing 
political initiatives of friendly legislators, and “the more 
lobbyists lobby their legislative allies, the more those 
allies will intervene” (Hall and Miller 2008, 994). This 
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mechanism suggests that to reduce the size of the “match-
ing grant,” lobbyists will target policymakers who are 
already “subsidized” by other lobbyists, possibly as part 
of “lobby enterprises” (Ainsworth 1997) and likely to 
follow cues and “bandwagon” toward particular issues, 
venues, and actors (e.g., Halpin 2011). In other words, in 
relatively dense environments, lobbyists are able to, at 
least partially, free ride on the influence activities of oth-
ers, and therefore individually require and receive lower 
levels of access.
Third, to reiterate, policy access, as exchange good, 
cannot be offered unrestrictedly due to limits in the pro-
cessing capacity of policymakers (e.g., Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Legislators, bureaucrats, and other 
political decisionmakers must be selective. This implies, 
in population-ecological terms, that in domains where 
the society or the economy guarantees the establishment 
and survival of large numbers of groups, there is an 
“oversupply” of potentially important information to 
policymakers relative to “listening capacity” in the pol-
icy process. The oversupply of societal pressures is an 
important source of control for a policymaker, as he 
“largely determines for himself what he hears from the 
public” (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 414). The needs 
of policymakers also depend on their institutional posi-
tion. That is, policymakers, among other mechanisms, 
manage to increase their information processing capacity 
by creating institutions of “parallel information process-
ing” (subdivisions in the legislature and bureaucracy, for 
example, by creating large numbers of policy fora; 
Broscheid and Coen 2007). For instance, the relatively 
large number of members of Congress (largely working 
in parallel) and the practice of members to offer superfi-
cial “generic access” (Sorauf 1992, 72) lead lobbyists to 
be “virtually awash with access” to the U.S. Congress 
(Salisbury 1990, 348). In most circumstances, the mobi-
lization capacity of society or the economy (the “area” 
term of the Energy-Stability-Area or ESA model) 
exceeds the policy “energy” or “demand” for lobbying in 
the policy process. In any case, both the “demand” on the 
part of policymakers and the “supply” of lobbyists deter-
mine the number of interest groups in a particular envi-
ronment (Gray and Lowery 1996).
In other words, when larger numbers of groups are 
active in a certain policy field, policymakers, whose 
attention is scarce and largely independent of interest 
group mobilization, will have to choose with whom to 
interact. This argument implies that, from the perspec-
tive of individual lobbyists, in crowded environments, 
access is more limited compared with when only a few 
groups are active. For each organization, it should there-
fore be more difficult to reach policymakers once there 
are many more groups active on similar issues. Our 
main hypothesis is thus as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) “Density hypothesis”: Groups 
active in relatively dense interest communities gain 
less access than groups active in relatively less 
crowded interest communities.
Importantly, the population ecology framework pro-
vides several explicit hypotheses about the stage of popu-
lation development and the type of organizations most 
affected by increased density. In other words, there are 
certain mediating effects which cause some groups to 
gain access as competition increases and some groups to 
lose access. The first mediating effect relates to how 
interest group populations develop over time (Lowery 
and Gray 1998; Nownes 2004; Nownes and Lipinski 
2005). One of the crucial assumptions in population ecol-
ogy theory is that interest group populations develop over 
time in an S-shaped manner, and the density at a certain 
moment largely depends on prior density (Lowery and 
Gray 2016). In cross-sectional assessments of the stan-
dard population-ecological model (the ESA model), the 
age or stability of the system is assumed to be the same in 
the sections studied, or assumed to be empirically incon-
sequential, as interest group systems only rarely collapse 
and quickly re-establish themselves. In longitudinal orga-
nizational ecological models, it is theorized that in the 
first stage of system formation, new interest organiza-
tions must overcome legitimation issues and several bar-
riers to collective action lead to a slow growth of the 
density of the system (Hannan and Freeman 1989). In the 
second stage, the system grows rapidly. In the final stage, 
an organizational system becomes mature and competi-
tive, and its carrying capacity is realized. New entrants 
will find it difficult to successfully enter the community, 
as critical resources such as potential members, policy 
expertise, and long-term policy relationships are all used 
by existing groups (Nownes 2015). Please note that this is 
also consistent with exchange-theoretical models in the 
sense that older organizations, in earlier, low-dense situa-
tions, have had more time to establish relationships with 
policymakers.
Given the intensely competitive pressures, we should 
therefore observe that especially in relatively “old,” 
mature systems, density produces relatively limited 
access. Such organizational dynamics can be observed 
within particular policy areas, issues, or causes, and also 
at the level of national interest group systems. Applied to 
our case, in relatively new democracies, in which the 
institutionalization of involvement of civil society in pol-
icy making has happened more recently, systems should 
be less mature and without a fully realized carrying 
capacity. When comparing older democracies such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands with more recent democra-
cies such as Lithuania and Slovenia, we assume that the 
transition from communism must be a relevant break for 
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the interest group system in a similar way that the Second 
World War has been for the Belgium and Dutch cases 
(e.g., van Waarden 1992). We therefore expect country-
level differences in the relative importance of density of 
policy fields in relation to the policy access of individual 
organizations. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) “System saturation hypothesis”: 
The negative effect of interest group density on access 
is stronger in countries with a mature interest group 
system than in countries with a relatively young inter-
est system.
The second set of hypotheses derives from niche the-
ory, an integral part of the population ecology perspec-
tive (Lowery and Gray 2015, 5). Niche theory suggests 
that specialization is generally favored in more competi-
tive environments. This competitive benefit adds to a 
couple of other organizational advantages of greater 
specificity of representation (Heinz et al. 1993, 376; 
Wilson 1995, 310–12). In relatively dense fields with 
relatively high levels of specialization, it is likely that 
the resource base of relatively broad, encompassing 
organizations in terms of membership and policy access 
will come under serious competitive pressure. Over 
time, lobbying through more specialized associations 
will become the preferred vehicle for interest represen-
tation. Indeed, such partitioning may establish a vicious 
cycle where resource partitioning weakens the member-
ship income of generalist associations, leading to a new 
round of establishment of specialized lobbying organi-
zations, which further weakens the generalist associa-
tions and starts the cycle anew. This mechanism should 
explain why some organizations thrive in terms of gain-
ing access in a competitive environment, while others 
are excluded once competition increases. Building on 
niche theory, Gray and Lowery (1997a) have suggested 
specialization in terms of tactics or policy objectives as 
beneficial for access gained. This is consistent with 
exchange-theoretical views noted above: those organi-
zations with substantial capacity to produce relevant 
political intelligence should have a competitive advan-
tage to their peers to exchange information for access to 
policymakers.
Somewhat similarly, we focus on specialization in the 
relative strength of the lobby function of interest groups. 
That is, some groups will specialize in interest representa-
tion through lobbying and others will focus on other types 
of activities, such as creating awareness or providing ser-
vices to their members. Browne (1990, 499–501) has per-
suasively argued that the lobby specialists’ secure access 
to the policy process contributes to organization identity, 
which in turn enhances the organization’s prospects for 
survival. In addition, specialization is encouraged by the 
distinct organizational demands of members and policy-
makers (e.g., Ainsworth and Sened 1993; Schmitter and 
Streeck 1999). For instance, members of a given profes-
sional association would like the organization to spend 
resources on a well-organized annual conference, 
whereas policymakers would like to provide policy 
access, but only if the organization is willing to invest in 
high-quality policy representatives. This creates an inter-
nal tension in terms of staff allocation. These distinct 
demands create incentives for organizations to specialize 
in either membership services or lobbying. Over time, 
this leads to lobbying communities consisting of, on one 
hand, a set of organizations focused on the efficient 
delivery of services to members and, on the other hand, 
organizations that we label “lobby specialists” focused 
on influencing public policy.
According to niche theory, we should expect more 
specialized lobby groups to increasingly gain access to 
policymakers compared with groups which do not spe-
cialize in lobbying, especially in densely populated 
interest group communities. Here, the gap in lobbying 
experience between service-oriented organizations and 
lobby-oriented organizations is more pronounced. Not 
only is the gap more significant, but the dynamics from 
the demand side of lobbying prevent a more equal dis-
tribution of access in dense policy domains. The denser 
a policy field, the more time it takes a policymaker to 
consider and evaluate each of the organizations in a 
field that may deliver a certain type of information or 
support. Using cues such as size and visibility (through 
specialization) therefore becomes more important in 
denser communities. As a result, the differences 
between lobby specialists and those that are not are 
strengthened in denser policy fields. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) “Lobby specialization hypothe-
sis”: The negative effect of interest group density on 
access is stronger for non-lobby specialists.
Second, competitive pressures may alternatively lead 
groups to specialize in particular policy objectives, such 
as specific policy domains or an issue within a policy 
domain. There are policy strategic incentives and survival 
incentives to do so. To start, given the common, Balkanized 
structure of bureaucracies (narrow policy circles each 
dominated by a few actors), issue specialization increases 
the likelihood that an organization will be a critical or sole 
policy interlocutor in domains where policy opponents are 
avoided and conflict is minimized. Such a position also 
provides organizations with an “identity” that facilitates 
membership communication, visibility, and, in the longer 
term, maintenance of members (Heaney 2004). This form 
of organizational partitioning in dense communities 
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therefore improves the survival prospects of the policy 
participants.
Gray and Lowery (1997a) explicitly discussed this 
mechanism and found some indirect effect. Again, we 
expect groups with a narrow focus to gain more access 
compared with groups with a broad focus, especially in 
interest communities. Due to the time constraints of poli-
cymakers in dense communities, these groups are forced 
to take shortcuts to find the right supplier of information. 
If an organization is the specialist with regard to a spe-
cific issue, this is expected to be especially decisive for 
policymakers. This leads to the second, mediating 
hypothesis derived from the population ecology literature 
on how density has a more favorable effect on specialized 
groups compared with more generalist groups.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) “Issue specialization hypothesis”: 
The negative effect of interest group density on access 
is stronger for organizations with a low level of issue 
specialization.
Data and Research Design
We use data from Dutch, Belgian, Slovenian, and 
Lithuanian comparative interest group surveys (Beyers 
et al. 2016; https://www.cigsurvey.eu/). The survey 
respondents are leaders or representatives of potentially 
policy-interested national membership associations of 
individuals or companies. Respondents were asked 
about organizational characteristics, political activities, 
and strategies. The survey questionnaire was translated 
from an English-language European Union (EU)-
oriented version by each of the research teams and 
adapted to the respective national contexts. Overall, the 
response rate to the survey was 38 percent, which is 
relatively high compared with other online surveys in 
this field (see Supplemental Appendix 1 for more 
details on the project).
The concepts introduced earlier were operationalized 
as follows. The dependent variable in our analysis is 
access to national policymakers. As access requires 
some sort of exclusiveness (see Binderkrantz, Pedersen, 
and Beyers 2017), we rely on the responses to the fol-
lowing question: “On average, how often did policy-
makers initiate contact with your organization in the last 
year?” Answers could vary from “never” to “at least 
once,” “at least quarterly,” “at least monthly,” and “at 
least weekly.” This variable serves our purpose as it 
assesses actual meetings between policymakers and 
interest groups where policymakers serve as gatekeep-
ers of this contact. To ensure our results are robust, we 
also test an alternative measure of access (see 
Supplemental Appendix 4, also for a discussion of our 
principal variable; see Table 1).
Our main independent variable is the density of a pol-
icy field in which an organization is active (H1). We con-
struct this by aggregating the responses of respondents in 
each country to the question: “How involved is your 
organization in the following policy areas?” (See 
Supplemental Appendix 2 for included policy fields and 
densities.) For each policy field, we count the number of 
organizations indicating that they are “very active” in it. 
We weigh this against the total number of respondents in 
a country, to measure the relative density of a policy field 
in a given country (to account for differences in sampling 
and response rates).1
As regards our system saturation hypothesis (H2), we 
can classify two interest systems in our analyses as 
mature (the Netherlands and Belgium) and two as rela-
tively young (Slovenia and Lithuania). In the latter two 
countries, due to later democratization, there are far fewer 
interest groups and much room for growth of populations, 
as we assume that the carrying capacity has not yet been 
fully realized. Rather than adding a dummy for maturity 
in our main analyses, we run the analyses in each country 
separately in a second step, to be able to evaluate poten-
tial differences within the mature or the relatively young 
countries.
Finally, the conditional hypotheses (H3 and H4) are 
measured as follows. First, for the specialization 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables.
Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum
DV: Access 1,108 (2,660) 1.53 (1.67) 1.08 (1.11) 0 4
H1: Density 1,198 (2,855) 8.31 (7.52) 4.88 (4.46) 0.57 21.64
H2: Countries 4 NA NA 1 4
H3: Lobbying expenses 264 (626) 1.16 (1.19) 0.37 (0.39) 1 2
H4: Policy specialization 1,198 (2,855) 2.57 (2.01) 0.70 (0.86) 1 3
C1: Government expenses 1,142 (2,449) 10.64 (10.08) 9.75 (11.22) 0 37.5
C2: Resources (1,158) 2,725 3.56 (3.80) 1.94 (1.95) 1 8
C3: Professionalization (1,197) 2,855 0.13 (0.21) 1.68 (1.68) −4.52 5.21
Statistics of dyads are shown in parentheses. DV = dependent variable; H = hypotheses; C = control variables.
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hypothesis, we looked at the number of policy fields in 
which an organization is active. This is similar to the 
measure of policy breadth used by Halpin and 
Binderkrantz (2011; also see Halpin and Thomas 2012), 
although they measured actual policy activity rather than 
what was stated in a survey. We used a three-point scale 
in terms of which the organizations active in more than 
four fields were coded as “1” (not specialized), those 
active in three or four fields were coded as “2” (some-
what specialized), and those active in one or two fields 
were coded as “3” (very specialized). In contrast to the 
measure of density, which is constructed per policy field, 
the policy specialization measure here is specific to each 
organization. Furthermore, lobby specialization was 
observed in the relative lobbying expenses compared 
with the overall budget. Associations spending more 
than half of their budgets on lobbying were considered 
lobby specialists.2 Unfortunately, this was only mea-
sured for Dutch associations.
We controlled for group type, professionalization, 
and resources. Each of these variables has been put for-
ward by the literature as an important factor, indicating 
variation in access gained by interest groups. Although 
we do not know whether and how these variables affect 
policy access, controlling for them allows us to assess 
whether density is an important omitted variable in 
micro-level studies. The group-type variable was coded 
based on the websites of each of the organizations by the 
researchers from the respective national teams. The cod-
ing scheme included eight categories: business groups, 
professional associations, labor unions, identity groups, 
cause groups, leisure groups, associations of institu-
tions, and public authorities (labeled institutional asso-
ciations); excluded from the analysis was an “any 
others” category. Second, we controlled for the level of 
professionalization of an organization by considering 
the way an organization took decisions, the criteria used 
when hiring staff, the training of staff, and whether 
employees were inclined to pursue a career within the 
organization (see Supplemental Appendix 3 for a 
detailed description). We also controlled for govern-
ment activity in a certain policy field, using Eurostat 
(2015) data on government expenditure by different 
functions of government as percentages of total expen-
diture. Finally, financial resources were measured using 
the 2015 annual budget of each organization.3
Because some organizations are active in multiple 
policy fields, the unit of analysis in our design was the 
organization-policy field dyad. On average, our respon-
dents indicated that their organization was active in 
approximately two policy fields (with a standard devia-
tion of 0.86). The procedure described thus approxi-
mately doubles the number of observations relative to the 
number of respondents.
One of the drawbacks of our design is that, even 
though the units of observations are organization-policy 
field dyads, we can only observe access at the organiza-
tion level (rather than measuring access to specific policy 
fields). In the main table, we nevertheless rely on this 
measure to throw away as little data as possible. However, 
we try to account for this measurement problem in three 
ways in robustness checks presented in Supplemental 
Appendix 5. First, we run our analyses focusing on orga-
nizations active on only one policy field. Second, we 
aggregate the density of all fields that an organization is 
active at. Finally, we focus on the fields at which Dutch 
organizations are most active at. These specifications do 
not substantially change the results.
Furthermore, the data that we use have a hierarchical 
structure which we have to account for in our analyses. 
Implicit in our expectations is that there is heterogeneity 
between units within policy fields and within countries, 
which we need to control for in our models. We choose to 
use simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in 
which we cluster standard errors on policy field–country 
combinations. An alternative is to use multilevel models 
which, as we show in Supplemental Appendix 6, overall 
lead to the same results. Due to the similarity in the results, 
and the less strong assumptions this method poses on the 
data (Steenbergen and Jones 2002), we opt for the OLS 
regressions with clustered standard errors in the main text. 
Given the small number of units at the highest level (four 
countries), we choose to first present models in which we 
are “naïve” about heterogeneity within countries. In the 
second step, we run the analyses for each country separately 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In robustness 
check 6 (Supplemental Appendix 6), we run the analyses 
with country dummies, which show similar results.
Analysis
We estimated a number of OLS regression models with 
clustered standard errors per policy field. This is the base 
test of our main hypothesis (H1). We present separate 
models per country to assess the effect of interest group 
system maturation (H2) and plot predictive margins to 
visually present the size of the moderating effect of spe-
cialization (H3 and H4). In Table 2, the results of the first 
analysis are presented. In model 1, we show the bivariate 
relationship between density and access. The negative 
and significant coefficient indicates that overall density 
has an effect on access gained, explaining a mere 2 per-
cent of the variation in access. In model 2, we add stan-
dard explanatory variables explaining access in other 
studies to the model and find a smaller but significant 
effect of density. This implies that overall (across the four 
countries) access is affected by the density of the interest 
communities in which groups are active.
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Next, we address our system saturation hypothesis, for 
which we turn to Table 2. The results confirm our hypoth-
esis on the effects of age of the system. First, for the 
Netherlands and Belgium, we observe a significant, nega-
tive effect of density on access. On the basis of the coef-
ficients, we calculated the size of this effect. In the 
Belgian case, the average access in respect of its most 
densely populated field is 0.29 scale points lower (on our 
five-point scale) than in respect of its least densely popu-
lated field. In the Dutch case, this difference is 0.36 
points. For Slovenia and Lithuania, we observed no effect 
of density on access.
These results are mostly in line with our expectations. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, with waves of interest 
group formation in the immediate post–World War II 
period and the post-materialist wave of the early 1970s, 
the interest group systems appear to be more mature and 
saturated, leading to more pronounced system dynamics, 
such as the relevance of density for access, than in 
Slovenia and Lithuania, where a substantial proportion of 
associations is a product of the post–Cold War transition 
to democracy. This confirms our first hypothesis that den-
sity indeed has an effect on access, yet only, as predicted 
by our second hypothesis, in countries with a mature 
interest group system.4
Next, we looked at the conditional effects. For interac-
tions, we looked at models 3 and 4 in Table 2 and tested 
the two interaction effects. To begin, in the Dutch-only 
model 3, we included an interaction between density and 
lobby specialization. The expectation was that especially 
groups with a focus on lobbying (i.e., the lobby special-
ists) would secure access to policymakers once interest 
communities became denser, at the expense of organiza-
tions that specialize in member services, or more general-
ist organizations focusing on various different tasks 
(Browne 1990, 499–501; Gray and Lowery 1997a). The 
results presented in the table are not in line with this 
expectation. However, when we look at the predictive 
margins in Figure 1 we see that in very dense policy 
fields, there is indeed a significant advantage for lobby 
specialists. We see no effect of lobby specialization in 
less dense communities. Only in densely populated fields 
do specialized organizations gain an advantage. The 
effect is quite considerable: even though there is no dif-
ference in sparsely populated communities, in the densest 
communities lobby specialists score approximately 25 
percent higher on the scale measuring access.
This type of lobbying specialization seems to be 
encouraged by the distinct organizational demands of 
members and policymakers (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). 
Table 2. Linear Regression on Access, Clustered Standard Errors.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Relative density −0.0379*** (0.00644) −0.0187** (0.00616) −0.0431** (0.0138) −0.0191* (0.00883)
Resources 0.253*** (0.0132) 0.316*** (0.0199) 0.248*** (0.0134)
Business Reference Reference Reference
 Professional −0.307*** (0.0663) −0.299* (0.129) −0.297*** (0.0676)
 Union −0.146 (0.0880) −0.156 (0.210) −0.191* (0.0918)
 Identity/religious −0.253*** (0.0568) −0.380** (0.104) −0.281*** (0.0581)
 Public interest −0.230* (0.0910) −0.255* (0.116) −0.237* (0.0899)
 Leisure/hobby −0.486*** (0.0812) 0.0924 (0.161) −0.482*** (0.0784)
 Institutional/public 0.358*** (0.101) 0.268 (0.207) 0.363*** (0.0949)
Professionalization 0.0329** (0.0109) 0.0664** (0.0188) 0.0328** (0.0110)
Government expenses 0.00460 (0.00249) 0.00725* (0.00323) 0.00457 (0.00250)
Lobby Specialization 0.0896 (0.185)  
Lobby Specialization × Density 0.0412 (0.0239)  
Sector Specialization 1 Reference
Sector Specialization 2 0.000617 (0.109)
Sector Specialization 3 −0.219* (0.0957)
Sector Specialization 1 × Density Reference
Sector Specialization 2 × Density −0.00334 (0.0124)
Sector Specialization 3 × Density 0.00775 (0.0102)
Constant 1.955*** (0.0627) 0.957*** (0.0745) 0.908*** (0.149) 1.057*** (0.102)
Observations 2,660 2,098 541 2,098
R2 .023 .299 .372 .303
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Commonly, the capacity of interest associations to simul-
taneously bring citizens together for collective purposes 
(something managed with selective incentives such as 
membership services), in combination with (or as a “tied 
sale” or “by-product” in Olsonian terms; Olson 1965) 
interest representation before government, is associated 
with high-quality interest intermediation. In other words, 
should these functions of interest aggregation and articu-
lation not be combined in a single association, as occurs in 
communities with high proportions of lobby specialists, 
interest associations no longer effectively function as link-
ing pins or interlocutors between state and society, some-
thing that must have implications for our interpretation of 
the political use of interest representation more gener-
ally—or should at least focus our attention for future 
studies.
Finally, in model 4 (Table 2), we assessed the relation 
between issue specialization and density. Surprisingly, 
we found some indication for a negative relation between 
specialization and access. This may be a result of the fact 
that we did not measure access to specific policy fields, 
but to the overall policy process. Groups active in more 
policy fields may gain more access overall, but less 
access in each field, relative to specialists. We cannot dis-
entangle this. More importantly, we do not find a chang-
ing relationship between the policy breadth of interest 
groups and the access groups gain to policymakers across 
varying levels of density. That is, the lobbying success of 
organizations that specialize in certain policy fields does 
not increase in dense political arenas. Being an issue spe-
cialist does not improve an organization’s chances in the 
political arena once systems become denser. It may be 
that specialization is largely a competitive advantage in 
membership (recruitment) activities rather than in rela-
tion to public policy. Interest groups may partition their 
membership resource base in terms of particular issue 
foci, something that may be largely independent from 
public policy. For instance, a dense community of cancer 
patient groups may specialize in particular variants of 
cancer, and hence partition membership resources, but in 
direct competition for access to the relevant policy pro-
cesses. In other words, the advantage of being an issue 
specialist is related to the long-term survival of groups 
rather than the short-term access of groups to the policy 
process. This is certainly something that should be 
addressed in future research.
As for our control variables, fervent population ecolo-
gists assume that the structure of an interest group popu-
lation largely, if not entirely, determines the strategies 
groups employ and, ultimately, the outcomes that groups 
achieve (Lowery and Gray 2015, 7; see also Holyoke 
2017). Yet, in the four-country models (see Table 3), the 
addition of density does not change any of the other 
effects (namely, group type, resources, or professional-
ization) in the individual countries (with the exception of 
two effects of government expenses). This indicates that 
Figure 1. Interaction effect of lobby specialization and density on access.
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density is an important, but certainly not a sufficient or 
necessary, condition in explaining access.
Conclusion
Perhaps the key contribution of population-ecological 
studies to the literature on interest group politics is the 
notion that the organizational context is of crucial 
importance to understand the behavior of individual 
lobbyists (Leech 2015, 197). Given this notion, it is sur-
prising that one of the most important contextual factors 
that Gray and Lowery themselves introduced, the effec-
tive number of lobbyists present in interest communi-
ties, has hardly found its way into the literature on 
interest group access and influence. Obviously, this has 
much to do with the problems in collecting data with 
which to adequately link the macro-organizational con-
text with micro-level lobbying activities (Holyoke 2017; 
Lowery, Halpin, and Gray 2015, 268). Yet, over the past 
decade, we have seen a sharp increase in studies map-
ping interest group communities across various coun-
tries and political systems (Berkhout et al. 2018; Halpin 
and Jordan 2011). These new data sets allow researchers 
to draw samples from populations and study questions 
on how macro-level factors affect the behavior of indi-
vidual groups. In this paper, we relied on data produced 
by such an extensive data collection project to answer 
three simple but important questions: does density lead 
interest groups to gain or lose access to policymakers? 
And, if it does, does it follow the logic of the most domi-
nant theoretical toolkit in this literature, namely, popula-
tion ecology theory? Finally, how important is density 
for access compared with other key explanatory factors 
for interest group access to the policy process?
On the first question, we found a clear link between 
the density of the environment within which interest 
groups operate and the access gained by interest groups 
to policymakers. This is a substantively important find-
ing, as it indicates that the study of the macro-organiza-
tional context matters, not only on its own account but 
also for studies focusing on the individual behavior of 
interest groups. In addition and in line with the popula-
tion ecology approach, in answer to our second question, 
we found that system maturity matters a great deal. Our 
country selection allowed for an explicit comparison of 
young (Slovenia and Lithuania) and old (the Netherlands 
and Belgium) systems. The maturation of organizational 
systems is commonly studied using a longitudinal design 
(e.g., Fisker 2013), but despite our low number of cases—
namely, four countries—we believe that there are strong 
theoretical arguments to assume that, of the various dif-
ferences between the countries, the age of their interest 
organizational systems is a plausible explanation for the 
relatively strong effect of density in the mature systems 
compared with the young ones.
Second, we found empirical evidence for the popula-
tion-ecological assumption regarding the relationship 
between lobbying specialization and density. It was dem-
onstrated that access of specialized groups remains unaf-
fected in denser communities, whereas relatively 
multi-functional groups have difficulties maintaining 
their policy function in the face of competitive pressures. 
This suggests that there is a complex relationship between 
(internal) organizational maintenance, (external) popula-
tion-ecological pressures, and the policy-oriented activi-
ties of interest groups. Future studies on the strategic 
choices and influence of interest groups will lead to more 
specific results if they measure the level of specialization 
of groups and their organizational context. In contrast to 
population ecology theory, we did not find any evidence 
that issue specialization matters more in dense interest 
communities compared with sparsely populated ones.
Finally, about the third objective, another significant 
finding is the relative importance of density compared 
with other explanatory variables. A strict reading of pop-
ulation ecology theory would lead us to assume that the 
structure of an interest group population largely, if not 
entirely, determines the strategies groups employ and, 
ultimately, the outcomes groups achieve (Lowery and 
Gray 2015, 7). We found no indication that this is true. In 
no instance did the coefficients or the significance of 
other important variables, such as resources, group type, 
or professionalization, change substantially with the 
addition of density as an explanatory variable to the mod-
els. This implies that density is not a critical condition to 
gain access to policymakers, but rather one of the many 
factors explaining access by interest groups, each more 
important under different circumstances. Obviously, 
much more research is still needed to substantiate this 
claim, but in this paper, we have not found much evi-
dence that density is a more important factor to under-
stand the processes of access than other explanations 
often cited in the literature.
These findings speak to the discussion around the 
complementarity and integrability of macro- and micro-
level approaches in interest group studies. The absence 
of change in effects of variables in traditional models of 
access after controlling for the omitted variable of “den-
sity” suggests that, even though heterogeneity between 
interest group systems may exist and be relevant for tra-
ditional models, as shown by Holyoke (2017), not all 
central variables in population ecology theory play an 
equally important role on the level of individual organi-
zations. However, this is not to say that macro-level the-
ories do not contribute to micro-level theories, as 
suggested by Loomis (2015). As we have demonstrated, 
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population-level characteristics (and their interaction 
with organizational characteristics) can significantly 
impact organizational opportunities to access policy-
makers. This speaks in favor of further exploration of the 
links between the two types of theories.
The results provide many avenues for future research, 
and more research is needed to further test the relation-
ship between population-level characteristics and orga-
nization-level factors. To further test whether differences 
in population density also affect political outcomes, as it 
affects the distribution of access, research is needed on 
the relationship between density and the influence of 
interest organizations. Furthermore, there is potential for 
studies on other population characteristics, such as the 
diversity of policy communities rather than their density. 
Research assessing the relationship between the diver-
sity of populations and key strategic factors, such as 
access, other (membership) mobilization activities, and 
influence, would make an important contribution to the 
field of interest group politics. Last, the micro-level 
needs of lobbyists and policymakers, and the macro-
level density, are clearly not constant over time. 
Population-ecological studies and exchange-theoreti-
cal views rely on important assumptions about pro-
cesses of change such as specialization within 
particular niches, the long-term institutionalization of 
relationships, and strategic organizational adaptation 
of lobbyists. Future studies may assess the implication 
of these processes on the access of lobbyists to policy-
makers, therewith also contributing to a better under-
standing of the responsiveness of interest group politics 
to changing circumstances.
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1. Alternative operationalizations, most notably the raw 
numbers, do not lead to different outcomes.
2. For this, we rely on answers to the following question: 
“Organizations like yours have to spend resources on 
many things. Can you tell us what percentage of your total 
resources is spent on influencing public policies?” This 
question is measured using six categories. For the analy-
sis, these were recoded into two categories: less than 50 
percent and more than 50 percent. This question was only 
included in the Dutch survey and therefore only empiri-
cally assessed in a separate Dutch-only model.
3. Respondents were provided with eight answer categories 
to the following question: “What was the annual operating 
budget of your organization in 2015 in euros?”
4. Besides system age, we also tested the effects of organiza-
tion age as a (control) variable, as new entrants likely find 
entrance difficult, as critical resources such as potential 
members, policy expertise, and long-term policy relation-
ships are all used by existing groups (Nownes 2015). Even 
though we found consistent positive effects of organization 
age on access across models, it did not alter the effect of 
density (nor of other variables in the model).
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